We studied the territorial behaviour of the Tasmanian native hen, Gallinula mortierii, a cooperatively breeding gallinule, for three breeding seasons at Maria Island National Park, Tasmania, Australia. Our analyses of 2738 territorial contests among 54 groups revealed that 87% of interactions were won by the group that initiated the interaction, 7% yielded no clear result, and only 6% were won by the opposing group. Asymmetries in the resource-holding potential of competing groups were not involved in deciding the outcomes of territorial contests. Our results suggest that asymmetries in payoff were involved, as in each of the 3 years groups with better quality territories were more likely to start interactions, and as a result, were more likely to win them. Only 6% of territorial contests escalated to involve physical contact and changes in territory boundaries rarely resulted from individual contests. The quality of a group's territory either changed very little between breeding seasons, or markedly increased or decreased. We conclude that major changes in territory quality occurred only under relatively rare conditions where the risks associated with escalated contests were reduced, or where the payoffs from a favourable result were improved. Males put more effort into the defence of the group territory than did females. The extra effort of males was directed more towards extragroup males than towards extragroup females. Females, in contrast, were equally aggressive towards both sexes. This suggests that the agonistic behaviour of male Tasmanian native hens may contain a mate-guarding component as well as functioning in the defence of territory.
The concept of evolutionarily stable strategies, or ESS (Maynard Smith & Price 1973) , has provided a general framework for the analysis of animal contests. Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) applied the concept of an ESS to asymmetric contests. They proposed that a contest between animals can be decided on the basis of any one of three asymmetries: (1) asymmetry in 'payoff', where one contestant may have more to gain by winning; (2) asymmetry in 'resource-holding potential' (RHP), where one contestant has greater fighting ability; or (3) asymmetry in some variable 'uncorrelated' with payoff or RHP that would not affect the likely result of an escalated contest if one should occur, for example territory ownership. An uncorrelated asymmetry can be used to settle contests even when asymmetries in either payoff or RHP also exist, provided that the magnitudes of the additional asymmetries are not too great (Hammerstein 1981) .
Recognizing that information transfer occurs during contests, Enquist & Leimar (1983) developed the sequential assessment game, incorporating a more detailed model of interaction. In deciding on what strategy to employ at any point in a contest, an animal should consider all information obtained in the contest up to that point. Natural selection may act not only on fighting ability, but also on the ability to assess relative fighting ability and on the decision rules based on these assessments (Enquist & Leimar 1983; Enquist 1985) .
Until recently, experimental studies of assessment in animal contests have only considered disputes involving single individuals. McComb et al. (1994) provided the first experimental study of assessment in territorial contests in a group territorial species. In deciding whether to approach intruders, defending female lions, Panthera leo, take account of both the number of intruders and the size of their own group, and thus appear to assess relative RHP on the basis of group size rather than individual characteristics. It is logical to expect that this same situation may occur in other group territorial species.
Further work on female lions has revealed individual differences in the extent of participation in intergroup conflicts (Heinsohn & Packer 1995) . Some individuals consistently led the approach to simulated intruders,
